Wargaming is one of the most effective methods for testing whether institutions can actually respond to Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) — as opposed to whether they plan to.
When Hybrid CoE, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the European External Action Service convened the Countering FIMI Wargame in Warsaw on 23–25 March, the purpose was to put that distinction to the test.
Six teams of experts from think tanks, civil society organisations, media, and government worked through structured exercises focused on FIMI targeting elections and democratic processes. Cronos Europa's Information Integrity specialists participated in the exercise.
Threat assessments and policy frameworks describe what organisations intend to do when confronted with information operations. Wargames test whether they can.
In a structured simulation, gaps between planning and execution become visible quickly. Coordination mechanisms that look robust on paper encounter friction when multiple actors need to make decisions under time pressure. Detection capabilities that perform well in steady-state conditions face the speed and unpredictability of an active campaign. And response strategies must contend with incomplete information, competing priorities, and cross-border dependencies.
According to Hybrid CoE's own research on exercise design, this kind of structured stress-testing is essential because information threats evolve faster than static planning cycles can accommodate. The Warsaw wargame applied that principle directly: it tested decision-making infrastructure, not just knowledge.
The exercise included practitioners with direct operational experience of information manipulation campaigns in electoral and democratic contexts. That experience is indispensable for the wider European understanding of what preparedness requires, because the tactics, narratives, and infrastructure used in one country are routinely redeployed elsewhere.
For Cronos Europa, working alongside these practitioners put our FIMI detection and cognitive impact assessment capabilities into a collaborative, multinational context that demanded practical decision-making under realistic constraints.
The cognitive dimension of security does not stop at national borders. Effective resilience depends on building relationships, testing interoperability, and identifying what still needs work — under conditions that approximate real operational pressure.
Hybrid CoE's willingness to create structured spaces for that kind of learning is a form of strategic investment.